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NATURALIZATION LAW: THE PROMISE TO BEAR
ARMS IN THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
Rafferty v. United States, 477 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1973)
Petitioner, an Irish national applying for naturalization, refused to
promise to bear arms in defense of the United States and requested
permission to take a qualified, alternative oath of allegiance.' Despite
a recommendation by the naturalization officer to the contrary, the
federal district court denied petitioner's request.2 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and held: The religious parallel test8 should
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 337, 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1970), pro-
vides in part:
Oath of Renunciation and Allegiance
(a) A person who has petitioned for naturalization shall, in order to be
and before being admitted to citizenship, take in open court an oath (1) to
support the Constitution of the United States; (2) to renounce and abjure ab-
solutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, poten-
tate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which the petitioner was before a sub-
ject or citizen; (3) to support and defend the Constitution and the laws of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; (4) to bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; and (5) (A) to bear arms on behalf of the
United States when required by the law, or (B) to perform noncombatant
service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law,
or (C) to perform work of national importance under civilian direction when
required by the law. Any such person shall be required to take an oath con-
taining the substance of clauses (1) to (5) of the preceding sentence, except
that a person who shows by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction
of the naturalization court that he is opposed to the bearing of arms in the
Armed Forces of the United States by reason of religious training and belief
shall be required to take an oath containing the substance of clauses (1) to
(4) and clauses (5) (B) and (5) (C) of this subsection, and a person who
shows by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the naturalization
court that he is opposed to any type of service in the Armed Forces of the
United States by reason of religious training and belief shall be required to
take an oath containing the substance of said clauses (1) to (4) and (5) (C).
The term "religious training and belief' as used in this section shall mean an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially po-
litical, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
2. Bernard Gerard Rafferty, No. 3129/30169 (W.D. Tex., Nov. 4, 1971). The
petitioner, a former priest in the Roman Catholic Church, claimed his belief was an
outgrowth of religious training, but independent of Roman Catholic tenets. Since op-
position to the bearing of arms is not a tenet of the Roman Catholic Church, the dis-
trict court found that the petitioner had not proven his unwillingness to bear arms "by
reason of his religious training and belief," and felt his refusal was based more on a
personal moral code. Rafferty v. United States, 477 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1973).
3. This test was outlined in two Selective Service cases, United States v. Seeger,
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be applied to determine whether an applicant for naturalization should
be permitted to take a qualified oath of allegiance.4
An oath of allegiance has been a prerequisite to the granting of
citizenship since Congress passed the first naturalization law in 1790.'
It was not until 1906, however, that Congress added to the oath a
promise to defend the Constitution and laws of the United States. 6
Implied in this promise, the Supreme Court held, was a promise to
bear arms in the country's defense. 7 Consequently, applicants who
were unwilling to promise to bear arms, for whatever reason, were
denied citizenship.8 In 1946, however, the Supreme Court rejected
380 U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See notes
20 & 22 infra and accompanying text.
4. Rafferty v. United States, 477 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1973). The court, in apply-
ing the religious parallel test, stated:
The question to be asked is whether or not an individual's opposition to the
bearing of arms stems from his moral, ethical or religious beliefs about what
is right and wrong, and whether or not these beliefs are held with the strength
of traditional religious convictions.
Id. at 533-34.
5. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 ("any alien . . . taking the oath or
affirmation prescribed by law, to support the constitution of the United States . . .
shall be considered as a citizen of the United States"); Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20,
I Stat. 414, as amended, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153 (1802), required an oath of support to
the United States Constitution and renunciation of all foreign allegiance; Naturalization
Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596. required a promise to support and defend
the Constitution and laws of the United States as well as renunciation of all foreign
allegiance; Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 335, 54 Stat. 1157, contained the same
promise required in the 1906 act; Act of Mar. 27, 1942, ch. 199, tit. X, § 701, 56
Stat. 182, amending Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 335, 54 Stat. 1157, provided
for immediate naturalization of aliens serving in the Armed Forces, but did not exclude
noncombatants who performed some type of military duty, from this privilege; Internal
Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 29, 64 Stat. 1017; Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1970).
6. Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596, provided, in part:
Third. He shall, before he is admitted into citizenship, declare an oath in
open court that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and that
he absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all foreign allegiance... ;
that he will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance
to the same.
7. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283
U.S. 636 (1930); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). See also In re
Warkentin, 93 F.2d 42 (7th Cir. 1937); In re Roeper, 274 F. 490 (D. Del. 1921).
8. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). The applicant qualified his
willingness to take up arms in defense of the United States in response to a question
on his naturalization application. The Court held that a naturalization examiner could
properly deny citizenship to an alien who was unwilling to take up arms. Justice Suth-
erland stated:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/6
318 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY -[Vol. 1974:316
the implication of a requirement to promise to bear arms as a prere-
quisite to conferring citizenship, and expressly overruled previous de-
cisions to the contrary." Unfortunately, the Court failed to provide
any standard for determining how to deal with naturalization applicants
who were unwilling to bear arms.
After some years of judicial uncertainty, 10 Congress amended the
naturalization law in 1950 explicitly to require a promise to bear arms
in defense of the United States as a condition to the granting of cit-
Naturalization is a privilege, to be given, qualified or withheld as Congress
may determine, and which the alien may claim as of right only upon com-
pliance with the terms which Congress imposes.
mhe Court may. . . ascertain . . . whether his oath to support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . will be taken with-
out mental reservation or purpose inconsistent therewith ....
id. at 615-16. The suggestion in Macintosh that an alien must take the oath of alle-
giance "without any mental reservation" was incorporated explicitly into the National-
ity Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 335(b), 54 Stat. 1157.
In contrast to the absolute standard applied to aliens, Selective Service legislation
passed in 1864, Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9, exempted from com-
batant duty those who were unwilling to bear arms by virtue of their membership in
a pacifist sect, thereby providing a qualified exemption from the duty to bear arms in
the Armed Forces.
9. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). The Court dealt with the Na-
tionality Act of 1940, which had replaced the 1906 act. The two acts were identical
regarding language pertinent to the opinion. The Court held:
The oath required of aliens does not in terms require that they promise to
bear arms. Nor has Congress expressly made any such finding a prerequisite
to citizenship. To hold that it is required is to read it into the Act by impli-
cation. But we could not assume that Congress intended to make such an
abrupt and radical departure from our traditions unless it spoke in unequivocal
terms.
328 U.S. at 64. The opinion also pointed out, id. at 70, that Congress had indicated
it did not support an absolute standard by allowing aliens who were noncombatants in
the United States military to be naturalized without delay, see Act of Mar. 27, 1942,
ch. 199, tit. X, § 701, 56 Stat. 132. As a result, the applicant, a Seventh Day Ad-
ventist, was granted citizenship.
10. Lower courts did not interpret Girouard uniformly. They were unsure about
the breadth of its holding and had no guidance in determining what effect unwillingness
to bear arms should have on availability of citizenship. Compare In re Crescenzi, 79
F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (petitioner, an Italian, refused to bear arms against Italy
or Italian people but was nevertheless permitted to take oath), with In re MacKay, 71
F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ind. 1947) (petitioner, member of Communist Party, who would
bear arms to support the United States only if in his opinion the war was justifiable,
was denied naturalization on these and other grounds based on view that Girouard held
only that "[absent] congressional action, a refusal to bear arms because of religious
scruples was no bar" to citizenship). See also In re Scarpa, 87 F. Supp. 366 (E.D.N.Y.
1949); In re Weibe, 82 F. Supp. 130 (D. Neb. 1949); Developments in the Laiv-Immi-
gration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. Rev. 643, 710 (1953).Washington University Open Scholarship
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izenship. 11 Examination of the statutory language indicates that an
applicant's refusal to promise to bear arms was to be assessed accord-
ing to the same standard provided for conscientious objectors in the
Selective Service and Training Act of 1940.12 This Act excused a
potential draftee from combatant service in the Armed Forces if, "by rea-
son of religious training and belief," he was conscientiously opposed to
such service.13 Use of this standard permitted an applicant to fulfill an
alternative oath requirement if his opposition to bearing arms was
based on religious training and belief. Two years later Congress re-
vised and combined all existing immigration and naturalization laws
into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,14 which adopted
a definition of "religious training and belief' from the Selective Ser-
vice Act of 1948.1' As used in the Immigration and Nationality Act,
the phrase refers to
an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include
11. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 29, 64 Stat. 1017. The statute pro-
vided, in part:
(a) A person who has petitioned for naturalization shall, before being ad-
mitted to citizenship, take in open court [an oath] (1) to support the Consti-
tution of the United States; (2) to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sover-
eignty of whom or which the petitioner was before a subject or a citizen; (3)
to support and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; (4) to bear true faith and alle-
giance to the same; and (5) to bear arms on behalf of the United States when
required by law, or to perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of
the United States when required by law ....
12. Ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 888.
13. Compare Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat.
889 ("Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war in any form"), with Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 29,
64 Stat. 1017 ("Mhat any such person shall be required to take the oath prescribed
[see note 11 supra] unless by clear and convincing evidence he can show to the satis-
faction of the naturalization court that he is opposed to the bearing of arms or the
performance of noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States by rea-
son of religious training and belief. ... ). It is curious that although the 1940 Se-
lective Service law had been changed prior to passage of this naturalization amendment
to include a definition of "religious training and belief," Selective Service Act of 1948,
ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, Congress chose not to include such a definition in the
naturalization statute.
14. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503 (1970).
15. Ch. 625, § 6(j), 6Z Stat. 604.
319
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essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per-
sonal moral code.16
The definition of "religious training and belief' in the Selective Ser-
vice Act and Immigration and Nationality Act has been subject to fre-
quent judicial interpretation.'7  Generally, the naturalization cases
adopt the construction given the statutory language by prior Selective
Service cases, although one naturalization decision construed the ex-
emption language more broadly than had a previous Selective Service
case.'8 In some instances, Selective Service case opinions have cited
naturalization cases in their discussions. 9
16. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 337(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)
(1970). But see Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 613:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociologi-
cal, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
It was the apparent intention of Congress that the naturalization act put the naturalized
citizen on equal footing with the native-born citizen. See H.R. REP. No. 2096, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1952). See also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 82
(1952); note 27 infra.
17. The judicial interpretation relevant to this discussion has been based on statu-
tory construction. Alternative arguments have been constitutionally based. The essen-
tial contention is that both the Selective Service Act and the Immigration and National-
ity Act unconstitutionally abridge the petitioner's or registrant's first amendment rights
by violating the establishment clause. Other arguments deal with denial of equal pro-
tection and infringement of the free exercise clause. The acts allow exemption based
on a religious belief in the sense of involving a Supreme Being and deny exemption
based on non-religious belief or a belief not involving the concept of a Supreme Being.
Nevertheless, no legislation providing for either an alternative naturalization oath or
a draft exemption has been held unconstitutional by any court. See In re Weitzman,
426 F.2d 439, 440-62 (8th Cir. 1970) (separate opinions). Basically, this problem
seems to have been met by liberally construing the language in both laws to prevent
them from being unconstitutionally applied. Any sincere belief would probably be ac-
knowledged as a valid basis for refusal to bear arms under existing rulings. See United
States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Ramadass, 445 Pa. 86, 284 A.2d
133 (1971).
18. Compare In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957) (naturalization case
which read phrase "religious training and belief" as single nonseverable concept so that
proof of personal religious code is sufficient and petitioner need not prove that his reli-
gious beliefs were obtained directly from religious training), with Roberson v. United
States, 208 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1957) (Selective Service case that held registrant's
"right to exemption under the law can[not] rise above the tenets of his faith as taught
by the church through which he finds spiritual expression"). See also 19 Oruo ST.
L.J. 351 (1958); 32 ST. JoHN's L. Rlv. 105 (1957).
19. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 n.3 (1965); United States v.
Burton, 472 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1973); Cassidy v. United States, 428 F.2d 585 (8th
Cir. 1970).Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1974:316] PROMISE TO BEAR ARMS
In United States v. Seeger,20 a Selective Service case, the Supreme
Court created the religious parallel test, which construed the defini-
tion of "religious training and belief" as embracing those individuals
who held a sincere and meaningful belief parallel to a traditional reli-
gious belief.2' The Court clarified the religious parallel test in Welsh
v. United States22 by holding that a deeply held moral or ethical belief,
although not necessarily characterized by the Selective Service regis-
trant as religious, was nevertheless a valid basis for exemption from
combat duty.23  The religious parallel test advanced in Seeger has
never been explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court as a basis for
interpreting naturalization law.2 4  Subsequent state and lower federal
cases, however, have concluded that the Seeger test is controlling in
the construction of naturalization law.25
Rafferty is the first federal appellate decision to rely solely on the
religious parallel test as the basis for permitting an applicant for natu-
ralization to take the alternative oath. This reliance on the Selective
Service test is consistent with the congressional practice of referring
to Selective Service law when drafting naturalization legislation con-
cerning unwillingness to bear arms. 8
20. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
21. [A] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor
a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption comes within the statutory definition [of religious training and be-
lief].
Id. at 176. In addition, a "merely personal moral code," which did not warrant an
exemption from the duty to bear arms, see note 16 supra and accompanying text, was
interpreted as one which is "not only personal but which is the sole basis for the regis-
trant's belief and is in no way related to a Supreme Being." Id. at 186 (emphasis
added).
22. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
23. Four members of the Court interpreted § 6(j) as exempting all whose "con-
sciences, spuried by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them
no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."
Id. at 344. Justice Harlan concurred in the result because he found § 6(j) to be un-
constitutional. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
24. In In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970), a naturalization case, Judge
Blackmun voted to deny petitioner's naturalization application on a constitutional basis,
id. at 440; Judge Heany voted to grant the petition on constitutional grounds, id. at
459; and only Judge Lay voted to grant the petition upon his statutory construction
of the Act, id. at 454. Hence the applicant was permitted to take the alternative oath.
25. See In re Ramadass, 445 Pa. 86, 284 A.2d 133 (1971); In re Nomland, No.
264215 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 30, 1968).
Prior to Rafferty, only one district court had applied Welsh to a naturalization case.
See In re Thomsen, 324 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
26. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/6
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The rationale behind this practice, however, needs reassessment.2 7
The Supreme Court seems to have created the religious parallel test
to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the Selective Service law's
requirement to bear arms,2s for individuals eligible for the draft are
27. The purpose of the 1952 naturalization act's incorporation of the Selective
Service act's language regarding the bearing of arms is suggested by the House Com-
mittee Report:
The bill is designed to put the naturalized citizen in the same position as the
native born citizen by requiring the naturalized citizen to promise to bear
arms on behalf of the United States when required by law, or to perform non-
combatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required
by law, or to perform work of national importance under civilian direction
when required by law.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1952). If that was the aim of the bill,
the naturalized citizen was already in the same position as the native-born citizen since
all citizens are subject to Selective Service provisions. If the House Committee meant
to say the statute put the alien seeking naturalization in the same position as the native-
born citizen, it could only be in the sense that both groups, although required to be
willing to bear arms, were allowed to refuse to do so because of religious convictions.
The two provisions were aimed at differently composed groups and were required for
different purposes. Therefore the legislative history cannot mean that to keep the alien
seeking naturalization in the same position as the native-born citizen, the provisions
dealing with the requirement to bear arms must have identical standards or must be
identically construed. Indeed, the pertinent language of the two statutes does not con-
tain identical standards. The Selective Service law no longer refers to a belief in a
Supreme Being but simply defines the limitation on what constitutes "religious training
and belief" as an exclusion of "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views,
or a merely personal moral code." Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 1(7), 50
U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 11, 1972). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
§ 337, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1970), still contains "Supreme Being" language. There-
fore, even if a persuasive argument could have been made that the intent of Congress
was to construe the exception to the bearing of arms in the 1948 Selective Service act
and the 1952 naturalization act identically, Congress obviously no longer intends the
two exceptions to be viewed identically because it has not revised the naturalization
law to parallel the Selective Service revision.
28. mhe Court's expansive reading of the test represents much more than an
interpretation of legislative intent or an endeavor to effectuate congres-
sional policy. By construing the statute to exempt [the defendants], the
Court protected the conscientious objector provision from a constitutional
crossfire.
The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. Rnv. 56, 115 (1965) (commenting on
Seeger). See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., con-
curring):
If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties. For
then those who embraced one religious faith rather than another would be
subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination . . . would violate the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It would also result in a de-
nial of equal protection by preferring some religions over others--an invidious
discrimination that would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1974:316] PROMISE TO BEAR ARMS
protected by the first and fifth amendments.29 A-hens seeking natural-
ization may not be protected by the first and fifth amendments, how-
ever, thus obviating any need to construe the naturalization law in the
same manner as the Selective Service law. Only after attaining the
status of resident alien or naturalized citizen is the alien entitled to
the constitutional protection accorded the status of residency and cit-
izenship.3°  If, then, the Constitution does not protect the alien seek-
United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 367 (8th Cir. 1969), also viewed the Seeger test
as perhaps necessary "to avoid constitutional objections."
29. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); cf. note 17 supra.
30. The Supreme Court has held that resident aliens are entitled to protection by
the first amendment, see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (dealing with de-
portation of resident for affiliating with subversive organizations), the fifth amendment,
see Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (deportation case), and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (dealing with right of resi-
dent alien to work). In his concurrence in Bridges v. Wixon, supra at 161, Justice
Murphy stated:
The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for
the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides
in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected
by the First and Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the
Fouxteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledges any distinc-
tion between citizens and resident aliens.
This supports the view that residency is a privilege which, once conferred, vests a right
in the alien to access on equal footing as the resident citizen to all the privileges of
residency, and the right not to be denied his status without due process-hence his
right to work and his right not to be deported summarily. The privilege of citizenship,
however, is not an incident of residency and therefore is not necessarily entitled to con-
stitutional protection by analogy to right to work and deportation cases.
For cases holding that aliens seeking the status of resident aliens are not constitution-
ally protected, see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945); United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1904); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581, 603 (1889).
Similarly, aliens seeking citizenship status have no constitutional protections. The
Supreme Court has not held otherwise. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605
(1931); note 8 supra. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), see note 9 su-
pra, did not negate this premise that naturalization is a privilege, nor did it state that
the alien seeking citizenship is entitled to constitutional protection. The Court refused
to read an absolute requirement to promise to bear arms into the oath because Congress
did not explicitly require such a promise, not because Congress could not require such
a promise. But see Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Con-
fer Citizenship by Naturalization, 50 IowA L. REv. 1093 (1965), where the author as-
sumes that, absent a specific statement to the contrary, aliens seeking citizenship are
entitled to constitutional protection:
jUinless a logical argument can be advanced for not applying a substantive
due process limitation in the area of naturalization, a refusal to apply such
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/6
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ing citizenship, the requirements to obtain citizenship are not subject
to -the first amendment, and the courts therefore are not obliged to
adopt the religious parallel test in order to protect the naturalization
provision from constitutional attack.
Even beyond constitutional considerations, it would appear that the
different purposes of the Selective Service and naturalization laws
should dictate an individualized and independent construction of each
law. When ,the draft is operating,81 only those persons -actually subject
to military service are required to bear arms.82  This duty to bear arms
is necessary to ensure an adequate national defense.13  In contrast,
the Immigration and Nationality Act requires all aliens seeking citizen-
ship, even those aliens who could never be subject to service in the
military,34 to promise -to be willing to bear arms. The purpose of the
naturalization oath requirement must be broader than maintenance of
an adequate national defense.8 5 The oath is imposed because of its
evidentiary value in assessing the applicant's loyalty to the United
States.3 Unlike -the requirement to bear arms in the Selective Service
a limitation premised solely upon precedent considerations and analogies to
deportation cases would seem somewhat tenuous.
Id. at 1101 n.45. See also In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439, 454-62 (8th Cir. 1970),
in which two judges assumed the Bill of Rights applied to aliens seeking citizenship.
31. Since the draft was terminated on July 1, 1973, the willingness to bear arms
is no longer required of any citizen. Selective Service Act of 1967, § 1(12), 50 U.S.C.
App. § 467(c) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
32. For those individuals subject to the draft (generally men between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-six), see 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(a) (1970).
33. The power to maintain Armed Forces is given to Congress in the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
34. Although the applicant in In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970), was
female and hence not subject to the draft, she nevertheless was required to promise to
bear arms. See also United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931); In re Thomsen,
324 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ga. 1971); In re Pisciattano, 308 F. Supp. 818 (D. Conn.
1970); In re Nissen, 138 F. Supp. 483 (D. Mass. 1955) (applicant required to take
oath although he was forty-eight years old and therefore not subject to draft).
35. Relaxation of the naturalization oath requirement could arguably allow pacifist
elements to enter the country who would promote anti-war ideas and thus indirectly
decrease the size of the Armed Forces. However, only a small number of naturalized
citizens are pacifist, presumably only a small number of those would actively encourage
others to refuse to bear arms, and a still smaller number would be successful in this
endeavor. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). See also 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 510, 523-24 (1972) (statistics showing that
percentage of pacifist aliens is negligible).
36. Justice Douglas assumed the purpose was evidence of loyalty when he argued
that a refusal to bear arms was not necessarily a sign of disloyalty or lack of attach-
ment to our institutions. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946). The
Washington University Open Scholarship
PROMISE TO BEAR ARMS
situation, where no alternative means to the objective of creating
armed forces is available, other means are available to measure the
loyalty of an applicant besides the requirement that he promise to bear
arms. 7  Therefore, since the promise of willingness to bear arms is
not conclusive in establishing loyalty, interpretation of the requirement
to take the oath may be more flexible in the naturalization than the
Selective Service context. An alien should be able to refuse to bear
arms and still prove he would be a loyal citizen.
Although the courts were not compelled -to adopt the religious paral-
lel test in interpreting the naturalization provision, the conclusion 'that
the provision should be construed with flexibility in light of its purpose
indicates that adoption of the religious parallel test is consistent with
that purpose. Rafferty may therefore 'be explained by reasons inde-
pendent of Selective Service case law, and although naturalization
cases need not construe the willingness to bear arms language in the
same manner as Selective Service cases, they may independently adopt
the same construction.
very label "Oath of Allegiance" indicates that the elements of the oath are assurances
of allegiance or loyalty to the United States. But see Note, supra note 30, at 1110-11:
"The apparent purpose of Congress in requiring an oath to bear arms is to promote the
nation's defense by requiring aliens to declare their willingness to serve in the armed
services." The author provides no support, however, for his conclusion.
37. The oath itself has five components, see note 1 supra, which indicate loyalty,
of which the promise to bear arms is only one.
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